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THE RELEVANCE OF POVERTY MEASUREMENT
TO FOOD SECURITY POLICY
Mahar Mangahas
Povertyand Food Security: CasualAcquaintances
Poverty measurementactivities and food security policymaking
are acquainted with each other, but are not, as yet, close friends.
Food security policiesaresaidto he undertakenout of aconcernfor
the poor; but they do not seemintended asmeasuresto deliberately
reduce the incidence of poverty. The measurementof poverty isnot
yet undertaken too frequently; when it is,nutritional statusor access
to food isthe most common criterion that isused.Yet this.hasdot
implied that poverty reduction policies include food related policies
and give them higher priority than policies related to other com-
modities.
Is it in the very nature of the food security problem that a polite
distance needsto be maintained from the condition of poverty? In a
recent paper,Siamwalla and Valdes (1980) assertthat:
Foodsecurity may bedefined astheabilityof food-deficit countries, or
regions or households withinthesecountries, to meettargetlevels of con-
sumption on a yearlybasis. Whatconstitutes targetconsumption levels,
andwhoseabilityto maintainconsumption isbeingreferred to, aretwo
central issues of acountry's foodpolicy.(p.258)
By confining the food security problem area to a short-term pers-
pective,they relegatethe poverty problem to another compartment:
Although themostsevere impactofshort-term foodsupplyinstability is
felt bythe poor,chronic malnutrition caused bypersistent povertyconsti-
tutesa long-term problem whose dimensions andsolutions liewellbeyond
the question offood-security, whichweconsider tobeaproblem of short-
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term variability. Thus, we adopt the trend level of consumptionas the
targetinsteadof someabsolutenutritionalcriteria.(p. 259)
Surely, however, sidestepping the issue should only be a tem-
porary move. John Mellor's opinion is:
Despitethe interrelationshipof policiesfor dealingwith fluctuationsin
food suppliesandof meansof ensuring that the poorreceivebenefitsfrom
those policies,there hasbeena tendencytoward divisionof concernand
analysisbetween national schemesdealingwith delivery of food to the
poor and internationalschemes to stabilizeavailability.Consequently,the
inhabitants of these two closetstend tO deal unrealisticallywiththeir
problemsfor lack of attention totheir relationshipto theother.
If food security isviewedasa problemof the poor,thenlittle purposeis
servedby separatingtheproblemof fluctuationsin food supplies from the
problem of inadequate total supplies.That is particularly true of the
searchfor policy solutions,becauseproduction-augmenting Policiesalso
affect fluctuations.1
How food secur!ty policy should be designed and how it has
actually been formulated in the past are two different things. The
focus of Siamwalla and Valdes is on the ways governments have
traditionally approached the problem. They observe that food security
has been equated with food price stability in urban areas, and that,
when threatened with urban disorder, governments have often opted
for food imports as a means of stabilizing urban food prices. How-
ever, as Siamwalla and Valdes remarked governments seem helpless in
the face of food security in rural areas, where poverty abounds.
These observations are undoubtedly realistic. There has been a
certain macrobias in food security policies, partly for reasons of
domestic politics (Lipton 1975; Mangahas 1975). There is also
another reason, which is the main thrust of this paper: the termi-
nology, the basic data, and the analyses which economists do are also
so macro in nature that they reinforce the macro-bios of politicions.
While it may be difficult to argue that such technical studies carry
the bulk of the responsibility for the nature of food security policies,
it would be equally difficult to deny that they haveany role at all.
At any rate, these are the means whereby economists, as professionals,
•may have some influence on the policies, and therefore they deserve
some scrutiny.
In the first-place, it is Clear that aggregate economic growth has,
1. In theForeword to Valdes (1981,pp.xv],xvii). Interestingly enough, Siamwalla and
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more often than not, taken placewithout an accompanying reduc-
tion in poverty. If the food security analysis is limited to such
Food Balance Sheet aggregatesas production, consumption, imports
or export, and buffer stocks,the implicationsfor the poor cannot be
determined without the assistanceof trickle-down assumptions,
which by now should be regarded as dubious (cf. Te 1978 and
Valdesand Konandreas1981).
In the second place, as Lipton (1975) has pointed out, the
economists'traditional practice of making food demand projections
by the income-elasticity approach is implicitly biased against the
poor. The growth in the market demand for food tends to be
dominated by upper income groups, since separateincome groups'
income elasticitiesare weighted by income (not population) sharesin
the aggregates income elasticity. Growth in market demand is
altogether different from growth in needby the needy.
The macro-analysiscould, of course, be made more conservative
by incorporating an adjustment for distributive inequality. For
instance, the International Food Policy ResearchInstitute's (IFPRI
1977) food needs projections to 1990 make a standard 10 percent
addition to the national averagedietary energy requirement in order
to allow for individuals consuming more than the requirement.
(IFPRI's objective was to estimate the Dietary Energy Gap as the
calories required to bring the entire population upto a satisfactory
standard of nutrition without reducing the food intake of those
above the standard.) However, 10 percent seemsmuch too small an
adjustment. Assumingthat the sizedistribution of food consumption
is skewed to the right and could be approximated by a Iognormal
distribution, the 10 percent adjustment would suffice if the Gini
ratio of food consumption were only about .0252 (Mangahas1978).
If the Gini ratio were a more realistic .12, then the neededadjust-
ment would be 50 percent (Mangahasand Rimando 1976). 3
In East and Southeast Asia, the difference in per capita calorie
supply between the countries which are barely on the marginof food
security and thosewhich areclearly over the threshold ismore in the
vicinity of 25 percent than a mere 10 percent (and, even then, food
2. This impliesa standarddeviationof the logof food consumptionof about0.05,
i.e., the (geometric)mean±only 10 percentor twostandarddeviationswouldalreadycover
over95 percentof thepopulation,whichseems unrealisticallyhigh.
3. In this casethe log standarddeviation would be about0.25 and the (geometric)
meanof foodconsumption± S0percentwouldcover95 percentof thepopulation,A distri-
bution about a mean of 2,000 calories,with a lower end of 1,O00and an upperend of
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poverty may not becompletely eradicated in the better-off countries).
Here are the rangesin per capita calorie supplies, according to the
Asian Development Bank's Key Indicators of Developing Member
Countries:
Low Calories percapita Period












Part of the blame for the macrofocus rests on the data-generating
establishment. The scale of poverty measurement and analysis
activities has long been constrained by the relative scarcity of cross-
sectional data. The Food Balance Sheets are convenient in that they
are linked to production and trade statistics which, in turn, have long
been annualized for the sake of the National Income Accounts. The
microdata sets,on the other hand, tend to be produced more on an ad
hoc and occasional basis. This is a part of the general government
orientation towards economic growth as contrasted to distributive
equity (Mangahas 1979a). This orientation tends to produce a vicious
circle of limitations on analyses, on policies, and on the production
of new setsof data relevant to the poverty problem.
To put it more plainly, the down-to-earth reason why food
security analysts' and policy-makers' year-to-year concerns cannot
directly take account of the poverty situation is that no one has
direct measurements of poverty on a year-to-year basis. 4 The con-
sciousnessof everyone isstill on the traditional, easy-to-get indicators:
4. India isan exceptionalcasewherecross-sectional dataare availableannually.Rao
(1981) estimates thatthe povertyIncidence in variousstatesin Indiafluctuates substantially
from one year to the next. India's difficulties with Its poverty problemare a sobering
reminderthat the presenceof statisticsis far from a sufficientconditionfor findingthe
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food prices, imports/exports, and production. For lack of better
indicators, success and failure in the areaarestill defined in termsof
thesemacro-indicators.
Now, granted that economistshave, for the time being, only a
few micro-setsto work with, there still seemto be sometendencies
for such micro-analysisto be subtly biased against the poor. The
selection of the poverty norm is an important casein point. Norms
are supposedto be determined by society's values;they should be
culture-specific. A highly relevant and straightforward way to learn
the socialmeaningof poverty is to observethe views which a parti-
cularsociety reveals about it (Mangahas1977). What isthe implication
for domestic policy, for instance, if Asian economistsleaveto the
World Bank the job of specifying the appropriate poverty line for
their country? (Very often, such World Bank recommendationsare
lower than those by native specialists.)What is the motivation for
computing "stingy" poverty lines based on imaginary and totally
unrealistic diets, e.g., by means of linear programming analysis?
May we safely assumethat policymakers are unaffected by such
academicexercises? 5
The Needfor PovertyAnalysis jargon
Poverty measurementactivitiesarenotpolicy-neutral. The greater
the scale of such activities, then, other things equal, the more
attention public policy may pay to poverty alleviation programs
compared to other programs.The measurementpresupposes a set of
poverty-related concepts which are acceptable to thc_sewith the
means and the authority to generate the requisite data sets. Such
acceptance,if and when it comesabout, isnot basedsolely, or even
mainly, on the intrinsic meritsof the conceptsthemselves,becauseit
alsoimplies an acceptanceof the likelihood that, asa result, poverty-
oriented policies,will compete more strongly for public attention
than non-poverty-oriented ones.
This political economy of data generation may help explain why
it is so difficult to obtain official acquiescence even for a concept as
simple as a poverty line. (Within ASEAN, only Malaysia has an
official poverty line usedin its development plan, even though all the
governments profess that poverty reduction is a prime objective.)
And yet the poverty line and the poverty incidence are only two
5. For a critique, see Mangahas (1979b). For a recent typical exercise, see Crawford
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among many related concepts needed, sooner or later, in poverty
analysis.They are no more informative in themselvesthan the GNP
is for growth analysis in the absence of the other variables in the
National Income Accounts.
This section, which borrows ideas from Wilfred Beckerman
(1979, describesa number of concepts that would appear to be
useful in poverty analysis. The concepts themselves, which are
relatively straightforward, inevitably lead to a new jargon. If the
concepts should prove ultimately useful; then it is only a matter of
getting usedto the jargon. First the terminology, then the gathering
of data to give them social substance,then the analysis to put the
entire frame to test and to generate new •ideas for poverty-reduction
programs.•
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of food among families before
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there are OP1 number of families who are poor, defined as all
families below somefood threshold. (For simplicity, all familieshave
the same threshold;for instance, the vertical axis might bedefined as
caloriesconsumed per equivalent-adult unit.) After the program,the
number of poor isreducedto OP2.
The total food benefits derived is the sum of areasA, B and C.
The (preprogram) poor derive A + B, while the nonpoor derive C.
The relative shareof the poor in total benefitsmay bedefined as:
The proportion of the poor's benefits which aresurplusesrelative to
the poverty line may be calledthe
Spillover Ratio = B/(A +B)
The program reducesthe absolutepoverty gap from A+D to D. The
proportion of total derivable benefitswhich go towards a reduction
of the absolutepovertygap may becalled the
Poverty Gap Reduction Efficiency = A/(A +B+C.)
It follows from this that the:
PovertyGop _ = (VerticalBenefit_x { I _ $pillover Ratio) ReductionEfficiency] I_ Efficiency _1 r
Since the objectiveof the benefits isto reducethe poverty gap,it
ispertinent to define the
Benefit Gap Ratio -- (A +B+C)/(A +D.)
Note that both the benefitsand the poverty gap mayalternatively be
expressedas proportion of total food consumption,and that relative
benefits divided by the relativepoverty gapgivethe samebenefit-gap
ratio. Then (A/A+D) isthe
)( ReductionRote = Reduction Efficiency x Benefit-Gap Ratio
Another ratio of interest isBiD, or the absolutespilloverdivided
by the remaining poverty _p. The implication of a high Spillover:
Finn Gap Ratio 7 isthat much could bedoneto reducethe remaining
6. Vert/ee/efficiency has to do with the sharing of the lower groups (the poor) relative
to the upper groups: horizontal efficiency has to do with the extent to which those who are
equally poor receive equal benefits.
7. One way of relating it to the other parameters is:
Spiliover-Final Spiliover Ratio x Vertical Benefff Efficiency
Gap Ratio Benefit-Gap Ratio x (I - Poverty Gap Reduction Rate)198 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
gap by internal adjustments meant to rechannel the spillover of the
program, i.e., there would be lesscausefor seekinga supplementary
program.
The breakeven point separatesthe net beneficiariesfrom the net
benefactors of the'program. In the diagram,the benefactorsareseen
to cons_Jmelessfood on account of the program, but that is not
strictly necessary. The additional food may come from imports.
Another possibility is that food consumption may be expressedin
terms of direct plus indirect grain usage;the upper-classbenefactors
could reducetheir indirect grain usagewithout reducingtheir calorie
intake by cutting down their consumption of livestock products.
Although Figure 1 clarifies the reduction in the poverty gap, the
spillover, and the leak to the nonpoor, it isstill relatively idealized.
I_ particular, all of the poor, down to the poorest, derive some
benefits. This may well be the intention, but the typical program
implementation will fall short of this to some extent or other. The
program implementation performance may be characterized by
certain targetting and operational efficiencies,8 which areillustrated
by Figure2.
The poor may be supposedto be the idea/target group. However,
the program implementation will involve a seriesof steps,only a few
of which are described in the diagram, which may tend to dilute the
participation of the poor. For instance, some legal eligibility require-
ments may define the coverageof the program. If there is no means-
test involved, then many nonpoor may prove eligible. The program
may face funding constraints; the implementation may become
feasible in wealthier local communities earlier than in the poorer
ones. Even when funds are available, there may be bureaucratic
bottlenecks which shrink the actual number of beneficiaries even
further. 9
Part A of Figure 2 shows a situation characterized only by
"leaks." Every step in the program fully circumscribes the following
step. There is an initial leak of the program to the nonideal group,
g. Examples of target efficiency ratios: the proportion who do benefit out of the ideal
target group; the proportion who belong to the ideal target group out of those who do
benefit. Examples of operational efficiency ratios: the proportion who do benefit out of
the legally eligible group; the proportion legally eligible out of those who do benefit. In
these pairs of examples one of each pair could be termed '(horizontal" efficiency, the other
"vertical" efficiency; but which is horizontal and which vertical seemsessentially arbitrary.
9. Thus,_fficiency ratios would be linked to each other by relationships such as:
Actual Actual Feasible Eligible m x x
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A. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION LEAI<S
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which is corrected to some extent as the narrowing of program
coverage affects both the poor and the nonpoor.
in Part B there are both "leaks" and "anomalies." Funds may be
budgeted to assist some people who are ineligible under the rules.
Some people who are not even in the budgeted list may receive
funds. These are anomalies. Some anomalies may be "corrective";
some poor people may be able to break the rules and join a queue at
some stage of the program, even if they have been excluded from the
queues in earlier stages. Some nonpoor people may be able to do this
as well, and this could be classified as an "anomalous leak."
Concluding Remarks
The prevailing system of measurementof socioeconomic pheno-
mena, as well asthe measurementof the institutional processwhich
interacts with them, isan important part of the policy environment.
In the case of the poverty problem, the subject matter is relatively
new and may be perceived as threatening to many established
interests. It is not a routine matter for the measurementactivity to
precede and become the basisfor well-informed policymaking. The
political and economic institutions may be such that the standard
procedure is for new policies and new measurementsor accounting
systems to be undertaken simultaneously, or possibly even for the
measurementsand the accounting to follow sometime after the
policy isinitiated.
This helpsto explain the great inertia or even positive resistance
againstnew measurements.The new measurement activitity may not
only open up new policy possibilities;they are even likely to be
interl_reted as tacit or partial official acceptance of the new policies
themselves. It is a rare situation that facts are allowed to be object-
ively gathered and presented first, following which alternative
policies may- be rationally discussed and evaluated. Those who would
oppose certain policies -- whether out of selfish reasons or out of
social principles - are only being far-sighted when they oppose
activities to bring certain facts to light.
Under these circumstances there seems to be no real option for
economists and other technicians but to try to persevere. Here and
there, within the institutional setting, there may be some oppor-
tunities where initiatives to do accounting on nasty subjects such as
poverty (foodwise or otherwise ) and the efficiences.of governmental
programs to deal with it may not be completely stifled. Given theMANGAHAS: FOODSECURITYPOLICY 201
very limited traditions which the less developed countries have for
recording, accounting, measuring and other forms of fact-finding,
believe that social sciehtists' efforts are more socially productive
when spent in generating new primary information on crucial subjects
than in analyzing the data conveniently being spewed out for them
by a tradition-bound statistical establishment.
All measurements should be unbiased; but not everything can
be measured. Therefore the topics selected for measurement should
conform to the presumed social bias in favor of the poor.
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